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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes within the context of a multicommunity model the effects of several
policiesthataffect the financing of public education. The key features of the model are: (I)
individualsdifferwithrespectto income, (ii) individuals choose in which community to reside,
(iii)communities are characterizedbya proportional tax on income and a quality of public
education, and (iv)acommunity's tax rate is chosenbymajority vote. We examine threetypes
ofpolicies: subsidies forresidency of specific incomegroupsin particular communities,
ceilings orfloorsoncommunitylevel educational spending,and income redistribution. Ineach
casewe examine the consequences of thesepoliciesfor both welfare and the quality of
education across communities. We identify several policies which make all individuals better
off and increase the quality of education in all communities.
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1. Introduction
Oneofthe most striking features of the primary and secondary public
education system in the US is the large disparity in spending per student
across districts.' As Table I illustrates for jurisdictions in several
states, spending per pupil can vary by as much as a factor of two even across
nearby communities. It is not really surprising that this is so. Given that
a substantial proportion of the expenditures on public education is financed
at the local level (approximately 45%), the differences in expenditures per
student reflect, in large part, the realities of the US income distribution
and its allocation across states and neighborhoods.
These unequal levels of educational expenditures per student have been
condemned by many on grounds of efficiency, morality and legality. Advocates
of reform have argued along the following lines: (i) Large differences in
financing are inefficient since, given same initial abilities, poorer schools
will turn out far fewer future scientists, violinists, etc., due to inadequate
resources. (ii) A system that allows the accidents of geography and birth to
determine the quality of education received by an individual is inimical to
the idea of equal opportunity in the market place. And, (iii) that education
is a fundamental right, equal access to which is thus mandated by the 14th
Amendment of the US Constitution or by similar clauses in state
constitutions
In the last few decades the question of whether inequality in educational
expenditures constitutes a denial of equal opportunity and of constitutional
1For an eloquent, if unsystematic, portrayal of this fact see Kozol
(1991).
2For a review of some of these arguments see Berne (1988) and Wise and
Cendler (1989).—2—
guarantees has been the subject of many court battles.3 Arguments marshalled
in defense of the status quo have contested the relationship between
educational expenditure and educational quality (and hence equal opportunity)
and the intrusion by the state on matters of local control.4 Nonetheless
since 1970 almost half of the major judicial cases decided have resulted in an
overturn of a state's school finance system and many other states have
independently initiated reforms in response to these cases.5 The judicial
systems, however, have left it to the different states' legislatures to devise
alternative systems of financing public education,
Although economic issues figure prominently in policy discussions
concerning educational finance and its reforms, formal economic analysis seems
to play little, if any, role in informing these debates.6 In view of the
importance of these issues, this is rather troubling, The interactions among
the uiyriads of variables involved in educational reforms are far from simple
to comprehend and, as the experience of California eloquently attests, well—
intentioned programs may have rather unfortunate and unintendedconsequences.
There, the combination of the Serrano decision and Proposition 13 left 91.1%
of students within a $100 expenditure band in 1985—1986. Between 1970 and
1989, however, California dropped from a tank of 23 to 46 among all states in
3For a history of US school financepolicy see Cuthrie (1983) and Berne
(1988).
4The association between schoolquality and other variables has been a -
topicof controversy since the Coleman report (Coleman et al. (1966)). In a
recent study, Card and Krueger (1992) find a significant positive effect of
school quality on mean earnings. See references therein for a discussion of
the related literature.
5Since 1970 New Jersey, Kansas, Wisconsin, California,Connecticut,
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming and Arkansas have had their school finance
system overturned in court rulings.
6A notable exception is Inman (1978). He simulates the effect of diverse
educational reforms on agents' welfare within a complex multi—community model.—3—
terms of its expenditures on public elementary and secondary education as a
percentage of personal income,7
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical analysis of the effects
of different reforms of the public education finance system. We take the
stand that an examination of the interactions among communities, income
distribution, individual preferences, and institutions is critical to
understanding the effects of these reforms. To this end we employ a multi—
community model in which individuals differ in their initial income and in
which education is publicly provided at the community level. Our work,
therefore, is in the tradition of the literature on multi—community models
with heterogeneous agents pioneered by Westhoff (1977), Epple, Filimon, and
Romer (1984), and Epple and Romer (1991). among others.
In our model there are two communities, each characterized by a
proportional income tax rate and by a quality of public education.
Individuals are free to decide in which community they wish to reside.
Education is financed entirely by the local income tax. The amount that is
spent per student in a community determines the community's quality of
education and consequently the future earnings of individuals in that
community. The tax rate is determined by majority vote within the community.
In all the stable equilibria of our model, individuals stratify
themselves into communities according to income. These equilibria are
characterized by the coexistence of a high tax—high quality of education
community peopled by those individuals with higher incomes, and a low tax—low
quality of education community where individuals with lower incomes reside.
7See Benson, C. and O'Halloran, K. (1987). Serrano v Priest is the 1971
State Supreme Court case which ruled unconstitutional California's system of
financing public education. Fropositon 13 placed a limit on local tax rates.
Data is from various issues of the US Statistical Abstract,—4--
We use the model described to assess the impact of severaltypes of
reforms (directly and indirectly related to education finance) on thequality
of education in both communities and on individual welfare. Ouranalysis
focuses on three general types of policies: those thatattempt to legislate
quality directly, those that target primarily the composition of a particular
community and those that redistribute income through taxes.
Our model generates several interesting results. We find that reforms
that attempt to directly affect the quality differential between thewealthy
and the poor community by capping the quality level in the wealthy
neighborhood lower the welfare of all individuals. The consequences of a
policy that mandates a higher quality of education in the poor community, on
the other hand, depend critically on the identity of the median voter in the
poor community, and accordingly may be either Pareto improving or worsening.
Furthermore, these policies may result in an increased difference in the
quality levels between communities.
Policies that influence educational quality throughattempts to change
the composition of a community (by offering, for example, subsidiesto
individuals who choose to locate in a particular community) also havesome
rather surprising consequences. We find that a subsidy thatpromotes the
location of middle—income individuals in the poor community is Pareto
improving under certain circumstances and can raise the quality of education
in both communities. A policy that subsidizes the residency of middle income
individuals in the wealthy community, on the other hand, makes all individuals
worse off (including those receiving the subsidyl) and decreases the quality
of education in both communities. If the subsidy policy is usedsolely to
assist the poorest individuals to locate in the wealthy community, however,
this poLicy is then potentially Pareto improving.—5—
We also consider redistributive tax policies. In one variant only the
wealthiest individuals are taxed and the proceeds are distributed to the
poorest individuals. We find that this policy may be Pareto improving and can
increase the quality of education in both communities. In a different policy
variation taxes are levied on all individuals in the wealthiest community and
redistributed to all residents of the poor community. This policy tends to
make all individuals better off 1toincrease the quality of education in both
communities, but also to increase the inequality in educational quality across
communities. Some of the theoretical results we obtain in this section are
ambiguous. A numerical example illustrates some possible outcomes of these
tax policies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the model and the
equilibrium concept that will be employed. Section 3 analyzes several policy
reforms within the framework developed. Section 4 extends the analysis to a
continuous income distribution and section 5 concludes.
2.The Model
We wish to analyze a model that will help shed light on how different
policies affect both the quality of education across communities and welfare
among income groups. The essential features that such a model should possess
are (i) communities, (ii) individuals that differ with respect to income and
that are able to exercise some element of choice with respect to where they
wish to reside, (iii) technologies that transform expenditures on education
into a quality of education and quality of education into future income, and
(iv) a mechanism that translates individual preferences into a collective
choice.—6—
To incorporate all the above characteristics into a model in a tractable
fashion is difficult. We choose to focus on an essentially static model in
which there are two communities, three income groups, public education is the
only option available to individuals, the quality of education is solely a
function of the level of expenditure per capita within a community, and
spending on education is determined by majority vote. While it is possible to
argue with each one of these assumptions and simplifications, they nonetheless
seem to possess enough richness to highlight many issues of concern in the
debate about education finance, while at the same time preserving sufficient
simplicity to permit an analysis within a multi—community model.8
There is a continuum of two—period lived individuals with identical
preferences given by
u(cl) +$u(c2) (I)
wherec1 is period—one consumption and c2 is consumption in period two. We
assume that u is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable.
Individuals differ in their initial (period one) incomeyj which takes on one
of three values indexed by i—l,2,3 withy1>y2>y3. The fraction of individuals
with initial income y1 is given by A. We assume Ai>O Vi and normalize the
mass of individuals to equal one.
There are two communities. Each community is characterized by a
proportional tax rate on first—period income and by the quality of public
8
Models of this genre can easily become intractable and most of the
related literature either restricts their analysis to characterization of
equilibria and conditions for existence or resorts immediately to simulations.
For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in working with multi—community
models see, for examples Rose—Ackerman (1979), Rubinfeld (1987), Stiglitz
(1977) and Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984). These types of models have been
used by, among others, Epple and Romer (1991) to study redistribution, by
Durlauf (1992) to sudy the dynamics of income distribution, and by de
Bartolome (1991) to examine efficency properties when peer effects exist.—7—
education that it provides.9 We assume that all residents of a given
community receive the same quality of public education and that, furthermore,
they cannot choose to supplement this education privately. All tax revenue is
assumed to be spent on education and the quality of public education is
determined solely by the amount of public spending per resident10. Education,
therefore, is a local publicly provided private good.
An individual's period—one consumption is equal to her after—tax income,
Second—period consumption is given by second—period income, which is
determined by the quality of education.In particular, we assume that second—
period income is an increasing, concave and differentiable function (f) of the
quality (q) of education received in the first period. Note that we rule out
both the existence of capital markets that allow individuals to borrow against
future earnings and of a technology (other than education) that allows
individuals to transfer period—one income into the future. 12
We nowturn to a formal description of equilibrium. Define ias the
fractionofthose individuals with income yj that reside in community 1 and
as the indirect utility of an individual with income yj that resides in
community j, i.e.,
9Although in reality property taxes determine the level of spending on
local public goods in a community, we prefer not to introduce another market
(housing) and an additional source of distortionary taxation and to keep the
analysis more transparent instead. For multi—community models that explicitly
incorporate a land/housing market see, for example, Rose—Ackerman (1979),
Epple and Zelenitz (1981), Innan (1978), Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984), and
Epple and Romer (1991). See, however, Henderson (1985) for a critique of the
literatures way of incorporating these markets.
10Thus, unlike, for example, Benabou (1991) and de Bartolome (1990) we
are assuming there are no peer group effects.
11Theextreme form of this assumption could easily be relaxed.
12Anequivalent formulation of our model is to commence with preferences
given by u(c)-*w(q) where c—y(l—t). This dispenses with dynamics and hence
with all assumptions about savings technologies.— a—
vj -u((l-tj)Yi)+ flu(f(q)) (2)
where tj and Sj are, respectively, the tax rate and quality level in community
j. Note that q is given by:
qj —tjJtlP
(3)




For a given profile of tax rates and educational quality across
communities, each individual is assumed to choose a community in which to live
taking as given the choices of all other individuals. Given each individual's
choice of residence, a community's tax rate t (and hence the quality of its
education) must correspond to that which would be chosen by its residents
through majority vote. That is, for t'e[O,l] to be the tax rate in a
community, there must be no tax rate te[0,l] which is preferred to t' by more
than 50% of the community's residentsj3
An important issue in defining equilibrium is the nature of the
assumptions made by the voters upon choosing a tax rate. Here we assume that
communities are not "too strategic". That is, each individual's preferred tax
rate is chosen under the assumption that the composition of the community's
residents will not change as a result of the tax rate voted in, and taking as
given the other community's tax rate and quality of education. The equilibria
that these assumptions generate would also be subgame—perfect equilibria for a
two—stage extensive form game version of our model in which all individuals
in all voting models with infinitesimal agents, there are always
equilibria generated by the fact that an agent's payoff is invariant to its
ownvotingaction. We ignore these equilibria by assuming that agents vote
sincerely.—9—
simultaneously choose a community in the first stage, and the tax rate is
decided by majority vote in each community in the second stageJ4
The preferred tax rate E(y;p) of an individual with income y in a
community with mean income p is implicitly defined by:15
u'(y(l—tfl—flf'(tp)u'(f(tp))p/y . (5)
If either i° or Pil Vi,thenwe define the tax rate in the empty
community to be that given by (5) for y—y1—p (i.e. the preferred tax rate for
a y1 individual in a community with mean income equal to y1).
Definition 1: An equilibrium is an x*_(4,4,,c4,4,t4) such that:
(i) Taking x* as given, each individual chooses to reside in the community in
which her utility is highest, resulting at the aggregate level in
(ii) Taking all 4andthe tax rate in the other community as given, each
is a majority voting equilibrium for community j.
Lemma1:In equilibrium no community is empty.
Vrpof: Suppose one community is empty. Then a y1 individual can always be
made strictly better off by relocating in this empty community where she
obtains her preferred tax rate at a higher mean income than in the other
community.
*
Thereis always a trivial equilibrium in this model given by p—.S for
all i and thus 4—4(i.e.,bothcommunities are identical). This is not,
14With the notable exception of Epple and Romer (1991) ,asimilar version
of this extensive form is implicitly employed by the multi—community
literature. It would be of interest, but beyond the scope of this paper, to
also examine other extensive forms (i.e, alternative definitions of
equilibrium) that allow for mare strategic interactions between communities,
are assuming an interior solution. u'(O)—" and f(O).0 are
sufficient conditions for this.
16This is a mere technicality. There are many alternative definitions
that yield equivalent results.—10—
however, a particularly interesting equilibrium from the point of view of the
questions that we wish to pose. Furthermore, this equilibriun is unstablej7
There is, however, at this level of generality, a problem with obtaining the
existence of any other equilibrium. This problem is due to the tendency for
individuals to wish to reside with others that possess an income greater than
their own in order to obtain, for the same tax rate, a higher quality of
education than that obtained by living with individuals of the same or lower
income. In order to facilitate the existence and characterization of other
equilibria in this model, therefore, we impose the restriction on preferences
given by Assumption i).8
Assumption 1:
—u"(c)c/u'(c)>1 V c (6)
This assumption ensures that the increase in the income tax rate that an
individual is just willing to accept in return for any given increase in the
quality of education is an increasing function of the level of her period—one
income, for all quality—tax pairsj9
In addition to (6), we assume the following joint condition on u and f:
Assumption 2:
82u(f(tp))￿o(t,p) . (7)
17lnstability is discussed at greater length further on in thepaper.
18westhoff (1977) provides the first use of this kind of condition to
obtain stratified equilibria. Similar versions of this condition have been
employed by Roberts (1977), Epple and Romer (1991) and Epple, Filimon and
Romer (1984).
191n other words, the assumption implies that the slope ofan
individual's indifference curves in q—t space increases with period—one income
for all (q,t).—11—
This condition implies that, when faced with an increase in p, the preferred
tax rate of an individual with a given income yields higher consumption in
both periods.20 The importance of Assumptions I and 2 will be made clear in
the following propositions.
ProDosition 1: Majority voting results in the preferred tax rate of the
individual with the median income within the community.
Proof: First note that, by (6), at/ôy>O (where Eis,as defined in (5), the
preferred tax rate of an individual with income y in a community with mean
income es).Next, by concavity of u, given a distribution of individuals
across communities each individual's preferences are single peaked with
respect to the tax rate in her community. Lastly, monotonicity and single
peakedness together imply that the preferences of the individual with the
median income in the community will be imposed as a result of majority vote.
Essential to our analysis is the effect of changes in a community's mean
income on an individual's preferred tax rate and the implied quality of
education. Proposition 2 establishes these comparative statics results.
Prooosition 2: LetEbethe preferred tax rate for an individual with income
y in a community with mean income p. Then Eisdecreasing in p and q—ts is
increasing in p.






20Given (6), a sufficient condition on technology to meet the requirement
specified by (7) is f' (f/q) +(f"f/q).This is satisfied, for example, if
f is log linear or quadratic (over the relevant region). Note that for the
alternative formulation of preferences given in footnote 12, Assumption 2 is ——12—
Note that (7) implies that the numerator in (8) is negative.
As demonstrated in the following proposition Assumption 1 has strong
implications for the nature of the possible equilibria independently of the
mechanism chosen to translate individual preferences within a community into
tax rates.




(ii) The income of every individual in community one is at least as great
as that of any individual in community two,
where community one has been defined arbitrarily as the community with the
highest quality of education.
Proof: (1.) If q1>q2 then necessarily t1>t2,otherwiseall individuals prefer
community one to community two and, by Lemma1,no community can be empty.
(ii) By (5) and (i), if an individual with income prefers (q,4) to
then so does every individual with income
Thus,in equilibrium, individuals are stratified into communities
according to initial income. One community (henceforth called Cl) will be
characterizedby a higher tax rate, a higher quality education, and higher
income residents than the other (henceforth called G2). Note that
stratification is implied simply by Assumption 1 on preferences and by
individuals' ability to choose the community in which they wish to reside.
We now establish that all non—stratified equilibria are unstable in the
sensedefined below.
w"(q)q/w'(q)>1, i.e.symmetric to Assumption 1.—13—
Definition 2: An equilibrium x*_(4,4ppp4,t) is locally stable if
there exists an (>0 such that for all with ipç-4i<c
(pj_4)(V(r)_Vi(rfl￿0 (10)
where r—(p1,p2p3) and Vj(r) is the utility enjoyed by an individual with
income Yj in community j given that the community's tax rate and quality of
education corresponds to that which would be chosen by majority vote within
the community for an allocation of the population specified by r.If an
equilibrium is not locally stable, it is defined to be unstable.
This definition states that for small perturbations of the equilibrium
distribution of individuals between communities at least some individuals
should wish to relocate to their original community.
Proposition 4: All locally stable equilibria are stratified.
Proof: Suppose not. Then there exists some stable equilibrium that is non—
stratified. Note first that all non—stratified equilibria must, by Propostion
* * * *
3, have q1—q2 and t1—t2. Thus, both communities have the same mean income
and the same median voter. Take the community with the greatest fraction of
individuals (if both communities have equal fractions of y1 individuals,
arbitrarily choose a community). Call this community C2. Now perturb the
equilibrium by taking a small fraction of y1 individuals from C2 and
relocating them in Cl. Mean income in Cl now exceeds mean income in C2 and
the income of the median voter in Cl is now either the same or higher than
before, whereas that of the median voter in C2 is either the same or lower
than before. The possible change in median voter implies V(r)V(r).
Furthermore, by (8) and (9), the change in mean income implies Vi(r)>V(r).
Hence all non—stratified equilibria are unstable.II
Proposition 4 establishes that all locally stable equilibria must be
stratified and hence are characterized by Proposition 3. Although (6) and (7)—14—
do not ensure the existence of a stratified equilibrium for all initial income
distributions and utility functions, we focus on those cases in which such an
equilibrium exists.21 The following proposition restricts the set of
equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 5: Let x be a stratified equilibrium. Then,
(1.) All y1 individuals reside in Cl.
(ii) If 4(O,l) the median voter in Cl is &y1individual.
Proof: (i) Suppose not. Then C2 is inhabited by all three income groups and
Cl is inhabited only by y1 individuals. The median voter in Cl, therefore, is
necessarily a y1 individual. But then the utility of a y1 individual is
higher in Cl than in C2 since mean income is higher in the former and she is
obtaining her preferred tax rate there. (ii) Suppose not. Then a y2
individuaL must be the median voter in Cl. But then the utility of a
individual is higher in Cl than in C2 since mean income is higher in the
former and a y2 individual obtains her preferred tax rate there. Hence, no
individual would choose to locate in C2..Ij
In view of Proposition 5 and Lemma 1, the two remaining candidates for
stable equilibrium are p3—O, p2c[O,l] and p3E[O,l), p2'-l.The case we
consider to be of greatest interest and realism is that in which no community
is completely homogeneous.22 Consequently, we restrict our attention to
stable equilibria characterized by p3—O and p2E(O,1).
In the heterogeneous community equilibrium just described, Proposition 5
implies that the median voter in Cl necessarily is a y1 individual. The
211n fact, modifying the quality technology by adding a fixed cost of
producing education, it is easy to ensure the existence of a stratified
equilibrium for all non—degenerate income distributions and utility functions
(see ¶Jesthoff (1977).
22furthermore, for any continuous income distribution (as considered in
Section 4) this is naturally the only possibility.—15—
median voter in C2, on the other hand, can be either a y2 or y3 individual.
Because most of our analysis is local, we will hold the identity of the median
voter fixed when we determine the effects of different policies on the
equilibrium. We will, however, examine the consequences for both possible
identities of the median voter in C2.
The potential equilibria of the type specified above can be parametrized
by the fraction (p2) of the middle class that resides in the rich community,
Cl. To simplify notation we drop the subscript and call this fraction p.
Each choice of p determines the residents of the two communities and hence the
quality—tax pair for each community. Let V(p) denote the utility of a
individual that resides in community j given that a fraction p of all y2
individuals reside in Cl. In equilibrium V(p) must equal V(p), i.e. an
individual with income y2 must be indifferent between residing in Cl and C2
given that a fraction p of individuals reside in CI. Holding the
identities of the median voters fixed, a change in p affects the community
allocations solely through its effect on mean incomes. Thus, V3(p) is
decreasing in p.
An equilibrium can be depicted graphically as an intersection of two
curves, 4(p) and V(p). There are two situations that may characterize a
point of intersection, depending upon which curve is steeper at the
intersection. Figure 1 depicts both possibilities. It is easy to show that
the equilibrium depicted by point A in Figure 1 (and shown in isolation in
Figure 2) is locally stable whereas that depicted by point B is unstable.
An equilibrium of the type depicted in Figure 2 exists if there exists a
p' and a p" such that for p">p' we have 4(p')>4(p') and
and the identity of the median voter is unchanged in the interval [p' ,p") .In
the next section we examine the effects of various policies on an equilibrium—16—
of the type depicted in Figure 2. We consider solely marginal policies.
Consequently the identities of the median voters are kept constant throughout
the analysis. This implies that the curves are continuous and downward
sloping in the neighborhood of the equilibrium, as shown in Figure 2. For
simplicity of exposition, much of the subsequent policy evaluation relies on
arguments using this diagram rather than on an algebraic analysis. The usual
problems of interpretation of comparative statics results in a model where
multiple equilibria may exist, however, remain.
3. Policy Analysis
(i) Subsidy Policies to Increase Residency in the Wealthy Community
There are various policies in place in the US which attempt to increase
the exposure of lower—income individuals to the higher quality public services
provided by wealthier communities. This is arguably something that is
accomplished by policies that subsidize housing for low—income individuals in
richer communities, by the busing of school children across school districts,
etc.. We show that it matters very much which individuals are targeted by
these policies: subsidy policies that targety2 individuals make all
individuals in both communities worse off, whereas those that targety3
individuals are potentially Pareto improving.
(a). A Policy that Targets y2 Individuals
Within the context of our model, a reasonable interpretation of the
policies described above is a subsidy to y2 individuals in Cl. We shall show
that this policy not only makes those individuals left residing in C2 worse
off which is not surprising in itself, but that it actually decreases the
utility of all individuals. On the other hand, as we show in section 3(U), a—17--
policy that subsidizes the residency of y2 individuals in the poorer community
may be Pareto improving.
Consider, therefore, a marginal subsidy to those y2 individuals that
reside in Cl, postponing for now the issue of how to finance this policy. In
terms of Figure 2, this policy shifts the V curve upward and leaves the
curve unchanged since, for a given PS the utility of y2 individuals in C2 is
unaffected by such a policy. Consequently, the new equilibrium is
characterized by a higher p and a lower V2.
The effect on V1 is not immediate from the induced shifts in the v4
curves. On the one hand, the subsidy to y2 individuals increases mean income
in Cl at the initial p (and therefore has a positive effect on V1). On the
other, however, the increased inflow of y2 individuals into Cl works to
decrease pwiththe opposite effect on V1. The net effect, nonetheless, is
unambiguous—p1 decreases. To see this, observe that had increased or
remained constant, then the equilibrium V2 would also have increased since, by
Proposition 2, taxes would not have increased and quality would not have
decreased in Cl. In equilibrium V2 falls however, indicating that p must
also be lower and, therefore, that V1 also decreases.
Independently, of whether a y7 or a individual is the median voter in
C2, the decrease in the mean income in that community implies a higher tax
rate and a lower quality education. Consequently, V3 also decreases in
equilibrium. Thus, the new equilibrium is Pareto inferior to the zero subsidy
equilibrium and has higher tax rates and lower quality of education in both
communities than the original equilibrium. Given this outcome we do not
address the issue of how the subsidy is financed; in whatever way the needed
revenue is raised, it is clearly not beneficial to spend it on this type of
policy. The intuition underlying the above result is straightforward. The—18--
equilibrium prior to the reform is not efficient. Were it possible to simply
relocate y2 individuals from Cl to C2, all individuals would benefit. This
policy, however has the opposite effect on the allocation of y2 individuals
and consequently is Pareto worsening.
(b) .APolicy that Targets y3 Individuals
Consider next a policy that subsidizes the residency ofy3 individuals in
Cl. The analysis of the effects of this policy cannot be conducted in terms
of the curves since that diagram assumes that all of group y3 resides in
C2.
Note first that the subsidy needed to induce any y3 individual to reside
in Cl (for any value of pe(O,l)) is less than y2—y3. To see this, note that
in equilibrium a y2 individual is indifferent between residing in either
community. Since a y3 individual's alternative to obtaining a subsidy by
residing in Cl is to remain with income y3 in C2, it follows that the subsidy
needed by a y3 individual to move to Cl is less thany2—y3. At the original
value of p, therefore, the effect of this policy is to decreasep1 (and hence
also '4andIll) and to increase '2 (and hence also '4andV3). The induced
inequality in the level of utility enjoyed by y2 individuals across
communities implies that p must fall from its original level, which serves to
reverse the original decrease in but further increases p2, 4,andV3.
The outflow of y2 individuals from Cl to C2, therefore, must be of a
sufficiently large magnitude that l in the new equilibrium exceeds that in
the original equilibrium (otherwise the inequality between the utilities of
individuals across communities would persist).23 In particular, the outflow
23This discussionpresupposes that an equilibrium with p*c(O,l) will
continue to exist with the policy intervention.—19—
of y2 individuals from Cl must exceed the inflow ofy3 individuals. The new
equilibrium, therefore, is characterized by greater mean incomes in both
communities and, consequently, by an increase in the level of utility of all
individuals (irrespective of the identity of the median voter in C2).
Before concluding that the above policy is Pareto improving, we must
discuss how this subsidy can be financed. One tax policy that serves to
reinforce the Pareto improving nature of the subsidy is a tax on
individuals in Cl.24 Such a policy increases the outflow ofy2 individuals
from the wealthy community, thereby contributing to the positive effects of
the subsidy policy.25
(ii) A Policy to Increase Residency in the Poor Community
We now consider instead a policy that subsidizes (marginally) the
residency of y2 individuals in C2.26 Assume, as in the previous subsection,
that the subsidy is financed by a tax on thosey2 individuals that choose to
reside in Cl. In terms of Figure 2. this policy has the effect, for a given
p, of shifting the '4curvedown and the '4curveup resulting in a decrease
in the equilibrium level of p and an increase in V2. This policy also
benefits y1 individuals since the fall in p increases mean income in Cl,
implying a lower equilibrium tax rate and a higher quality level there.
If a y3 individual is the median voter in C2, the subsidy policy makes
y3
individuals better off since, by Proposition 2, the increase in C2's mean
income implies a lower equilibrium tax rate and a higher quality of education
24The tax imposed to finance education is assumed to be leviedon the
pre—subsidy tax income.
25Taxes levied on other groups have ambiguous welfare effects ingeneral.
26Similar to the analysis in 3ib, one can show thata subsidy to
individuals in C2 is Pareto improving.—20—
in C2 also. Consequently, in this case a policy that subsidizes the residency
of y2 individuals in C2 is Pareto improving.
If, however, a y2 individual is the median voter in C2, the effect on V3
is ambiguous. On the one hand, for any given tax rate the increase in mean
income in C2 makes all individuals in that community better off. On the other
hand, the y2 median voter responds to the change in her income and in C2's
mean income by voting in a different tax rate. By (5), the sign of the change
in the tax rate depends on the magnitudes of the changes inboth y2's income
and in the community's mean income. A lower tax rate increases '13; a higher
tax rate decreases V3. In the latter case the net effect on V3 is ambiguous
since the increase in mean income works to increase y3 welfare but the greater
tax rate reduces it.
The intuition behind the results of this policy is similar to that given
in 3(i).27 Now, however, the policy helps to allocate individuals more
efficiently since it increases the incentive for y2 individuals to locate in
C2.
(iii) A Cap on the Quality of Education in the Wealthy Community
Some states have implemented policies that in effect place a cap on the
quality of public education of their richer communities. The effects of such
policies can be studied in our model by analyzing a restriction on the quality
of education in Cl to some level q1 (or, equivalently, a restriction on the
level of spending on education per student). This restriction is assumed to
be binding at the original equilibrium level of quality in Cl.
27Note, however, that a subsidy toy2 individuals in C2 is not equivalent
to a tax on y2 individuals in Cl (see section 3ia).—21—
In terms of Figure 2, a (marginally binding) cap on thequality of
education in Cl shifts the 4curveup in the vicinity of the original
equilibrium. To see why, note that at the initial level of mean income Cl
must institute a lower tax rate than previously in order to reduce the
quality
of education to its maximum allowed level. This decrease in the tax rate is
preferred by y2 individuals since, for the same mean income, they desire a
lower tax rate than y1 individuals. Thus, the new equilibrium is
characterized by a greater p and a decrease in V2. Note that in thenew
equilibrium the quality cap must be binding. If it were not, the V curves
would be unchanged and would thus yield the original equilibrium.
The consequences of the quality cap policy are somewhat surprising.
Although at the initial p the y2 individuals in Cl are better off than before,
the resulting outflow of y2 individuals from C2 lowers and decreases mean
income in Cl. The decrease in p1 allows Cl's tax rate to increase which
serves to lower the utility of y2 individuals in Cl. Thus, the new
equilibrium is characterized by a higher p. a decrease in quality in both
communities (q—1), a higher tax rate in C2, and a decrease inV1. V2 and
V3.28 Note that this conclusion holds independently of the identity of the
median voter in CL Thus, this policy results in a Pareto inferior
equilibrium relative to the policy of zero cap.
(iv) A Floor on the Quality of Education in the Poor Community
Next we consider a policy that mandates a (marginally) higher quality of
education, 2' in C2. We assume that at the original equilibrium q2<2 so
that at the initial p this policy requires a higher tax rate in C2. Note
28The effect of this policy on
t1isambiguous.—22--.
that, as in the previous policy analysis, the quality constraint must be
binding in the new equilibrium.
The identity of the median voter in C2 determines the direction in which
the curves in Figure 2 shift in response to this policy. If y3 is the median
voter, the tax increase at the original p moves the tax rate in C2 closer to
one preferred by a y2 individual, thus increasing V at the initial p.If,
however, y2 is the median voter, the forced tax increase decreases the utility
of a y2 individual in C2 at the initial p. Hence, the V curve shifts up in
the former case and down in the latter. We analyze each case separately.
Given y3 as the median voter in C2, the new equilibrium is characterized
by a decrease in p, an increase in the quality of education of both
communities (q-'2), a lower tax rate in Cl, a higher tax rate in C2, and an
increase in V2. V1 is also greater (since mean income in Cl increases), but
the effect on V3 is ambiguous. Whereas the higher tax rate at the initial
mean income decreases their welfare, the increase in mean income in C2 makes
them better off.
If, instead, y2 is the median voter in C2, the new equilibrium is
characterized by an increase in p and a decrease in V2. The increase in p
implies that individuals are likewise worse off than before since mean
income in CL falls, As in the previous case, two factors affect V3. Now,
however, they both serve to decrease V3 since mean income falls and the tax
rate is increased. Consequently, when y2 is the median voter in C2 a policy
that mandates an increase in the quality of education in C2 makes all
individuals worse off.
The above disparity in results stems entirely from the fact that the tax
increase has opposite effects on y2's utility in C2 (at the initial p)
depending on the identity of the median voter in that community. If y3 is the—23—
median voter, a y2 individual prefers a higher tax rate for the same mean
income than that chosen by the community. Consequently, a small tax increase
raises relative to and generates a y2 inflow into C2, thereby
increasing mean income in both communities with the attendant beneficial
effects. In the case of a median voter, the move away from this group's
preferred tax rate causes a y2 outfow into Cl, thereby decreasing mean income
in both communities and all individuals' utilities.
(v) Redistributive Tax Policy
We now explore the effects of some redistributive tax policies on the
equilibrium of the model. We consider two policies: one that redistributes
from the wealthiest to the poorest individuals (i.e. from to )'3). and the
other that redistributes from the wealthiest to the poorest community (i.e.
from Cl to C2). Both policies are in place in many states.
(a). Redistribution From the Wealthiest to the Poorest Individuals
We consider a policy that places a proportional tax r on the income of
individuals and distributes the proceeds in a lump—sum fashion toy3
individuals. We assume that 4islevied on y1, not on y1(l—r) but that t
is levied on y3+ry1(A1/A3). We analyze the two components of this
redistributive policy separately, beginning with the transfer of income to y3
individuals.
Consider, therefore, a situation where y3 increases and y1 and y2 remain
unchanged. Independently of the identity of the median voter in C2, the
curve shifts upward and the curve is left unchanged resulting, in
equilibrium, in a fall in p and an increase in V2. In the new equilibrium
mean income has increased in both communities. Thus, by Proposition 2, the—24—
utility of all three groups is higher as is the quality of education in both
communities.
Next consider a proportional tax r solely on the income of y1
individuals, assuming for now that the resulting revenue is simply discarded.
At the original equilibrium tax rate y1 individuals have the same second—
period consumption but lower first—period consumption. Consequently1 they
prefer a lower tax rate which, at the initial level of p. is also closer to
the rate preferred by y2 individuals in Cl. Thus, the 4curve shifts up and
the V curve is left unchanged. The new equilibrium is characterized by a
higher p and a lower V2. Since mean income falls in both communities, so do
V1, V3 and the quality of education in both communities.
Combining the two components of the redistributive tax policy suggests
that the net effect on utility and on the quality of education is ambiguous.
Two different effects are at work here. First, the community composition
effect given by changes in p affects all individuals' utilities in the same
direction (i.e. V increases (decreases) as p decreases (increases)). Second,
individuals are worse off due to r and y3 individuals are better off
because of the transfer. Intuitively, for this tax policy to be Pareto
improving p must decrease by a sufficient amount to offset the negative effect
of r on y1 individuals. Although one can obtain analytic expressions for
changes in utilities and p, these expressions are not particularly
illuminating. A numerical example serves to illustrate some of the outcomes.
The specification and results are shown in Table 2.
Panel A reports percent changes in utilities, in p. in total spending on
education (E), and in educational quality in each community. For higher
values of y2, this policy makes y1 individuals worse off but all other
individuals better off, whereas for lower values of y2 all individuals are—25—
madebetter off. The table shows that as y2 decreases, the responsiveness of
p increases1 resulting in a greater outflow of y2 individuals from the rich
community.
Table 2 also indicates changes in spending on education. In thisexample
when y1 individuals are made worse off, total spending on education increases
although quality increases in the poor community and decreases in the rich
community. When the policy is Pareto improving1 quality increases in both
communities and the ratio of quality in the poor to rich neighborhood
increases. Increases in quality for both communities need not imply that
total spending on education increases (since the poor community is becoming
relatively larger) and, in fact, in these examples it decreases.
(b). Redistribution From the Wealthy to the Poor Community
We now consider a policy that taxes the income of all individuals in Cl
at rate r and distributes the proceeds lump sumtoall individuals in C2.29
Asindicated by our previous arguments (see also (3.ib)), the effect of this
policy on the equilibrium is ambiguous. Intuition suggests, however, that
this policy should have a larger impact on the movement ofy2 individuals from
Cl into C2 since the tax directly affects their relative incomes in the two
communities.
Panel B presents results for the same example used in panel A. In all
cases the tax is Pareto improving, lowers total spending on education, and
increases the quality of education in both communities. This is in accordance
with the intuition expressed above since the greater the p response, the more
likely it is that this policy is Pareto improving. One difference between
policy that stipulates that the funds be used to finance education in
C2 produces the same qualitative results.—26—
this and the previous policy, however, is that in all cases the increase in
quality in the wealthy community exceeds that in the poor community in
percentage terms, implying that inequality as measured by the ratio of
qualities is increased by this policy.
4. Continuous Income Distributions
While the assumption of only three income types is a useful
simplification, it is important to determine whether the results of the
preceding section are robust with respect to changes in this feature. This
section assumes a continuous distribution of income types and examines how the
effects of the policy reforms of section 3 carry over to this setting.
Note that Propositions 1,3 and 4 do not depend on the 3—type discrete
income distribution; they are valid for any continuous income distribution.
A stratified equilibrium, therefore, is now characterized by an income level
y such that C2 contains all individuals with y4, and Cl contains all
individuals with y>. Individuals with incomereside in either community.
Each choice of ,henceforthcalled the boundary individual, implies tax
rates and education qualities for the two communities. If is the
utility attained by the boundary individual conditional upon residing in
community j, equilibrium requires
An important result in the earlier analysis was given by Proposition 2:
keeping the median voters constant, increases in p imply a higher tax rate and
a lower quality of education in both communities. This result reflected the
effect of a change in a community's mean income on allocations holding median
income constant, With a continuous income distribution the effect of the
induced change in the identity of the median individual within a community can
no longer be ignored even for marginal reforms. Letting y denote the median—27—
income in a community with mean income p and majority vote tax rate
differentiation of equation (5) yields:
dt* A($/3) —fl[u"(f(gflf'2q+u'(f(g))f"q+u'(f(q))f'](ap/a)
A*a2 2 2 (1)
uTM(y(l—t ))y +fip[u"(f(qflf' +u'(f(qflf"
A — A **A2 —
— pA(3y/ay)—(flu'(f(qflf'p—u"(y(l—t))ty ](Bp/Oy) > (12 — A*A2 2 2
dy u"(y(l—t fly +fiji(u"(f(qflf'+u'(f(qflf")
*A *A *A
where A. —(u((l—t)y)(l—t )y+u'((l—t )y)] C 0.
Note that both mean and median income in each community are increasing in
.Thedenominator in these expressions is identical to the one in (8) and
(9) and is negative. The numerators, however, now contain an additional term,
A, which by Assumption 1 is negative. Although expression (12) is therefore
always positive, the numerator of (11) cannot be signed without additional
assumptions. Previously condition (7) implied the effect on the tax rate of
a marginal increase in p was positive. Now a stronger condition is required
to ensure that the effect of the change in mean income on the tax rate
dominates the effect of a median voter with a greater income. Henceforth we
impose dt*/d so that, as in the previous section, an increase in mean income
brought about by a small change in the identity of the border individual
decreases a community's equilibrium tax rate.
Given our above assumption, VgG) is an increasing function of j.The
intersection of the V,() curves define an equilibrium. As before, we focus
only on stable equilibria as depicted in Figure 3. Two examples illustrate
how the policy reforms of section 3 carry over to this setting.
First consider a cap on quality in the wealthy community. This shifts
the curve up in the vicinity of and leaves the curve unchanged,
decreasing the equilibrium value of .Thequality of education falls in—28—
both communities (quality in Cl is equal to its capped level). The tax rate
in C2 is unambiguously higher. Hence, all individuals in C2 are made worse
off (i.e. those individuals with yj* ,wherea prime refer to the new
equilibrium value of the variable). The welfare effect for individuals in Cl,
however, is more complex. If t'e4thenthis policy, as before, is
unambiguously welfare worsening for all individuals in Cl. If, on the other
**
hand,t1'<t1 (which is possible since the initial equilibrium tax rate was
lowered to meet the quality constraint) then although those individuals with
are worse off, there may be individuals with y(* ,y1)thatare
made better off due to a (t,q) bundle is now closer to their preferred one.
Consider now the policy of the previous section that subsidized
individuals to locate in Cl. A similar policy in the present context would be
to subsidize those individuals in C2 with an income in a small neighborhood of
Ignoring the financing of this subsidy, this policy induces a
discontinuity in the curve, shifting it upward in the neighborhood of
Consequently, the new equilibrium is characterized by a lower value of ,
highertaxes and a lower quality of education in both communities.
Obviously, all individuals that do not move as a result of this subsidy policy
are worse off than before. Some individuals that move to Cl and receive the
subsidy, however, may be better off. Although this last possibility indicates
a slight weakening of the result obtained in section 3 (where this policy was
Pareto dominated by a zero subsidy policy), it is at most a fraction of those
individuals who move that Day be made better off since one can show that the
boundary individual in the new equilibrium is strictly worse off and thus, by
continuity, so are individuals with incomes only slightly greater.—29—
S. Conclusion
Making use of a simple multi—community model we obtain strong predictions
about the impact of several policies on community tax rates, qualities of
education, the allocation of individuals across communities, and welfare. We
summarize our main findings below.
Policies that subsidize the location of particular individuals in
specific communities have very different effects depending both on the income
group and the community targeted. Whereas subsidizing middle income people to
locate in the wealthy community reduces the welfare of all individuals and
lowers the quality of education in both communities, a subsidy to locate
lowest income individuals in the wealthy community can make everyone better
off and raise the quality of education in both communities. A policy that
subsidizes the residency of middle income individuals in the poor community is
Pareto improving and increases the quality of education in both communities.
Many states have attempted to deal with inequality in per pupil spending
across communities by requiring that rich communities spend less and/or poor
communities spend more. We find that a policy that limits spending in the
rich community has negative consequences: the quality of education in both
communities decreases and all individuals are made worse off, Interestingly,
the effects of a policy that mandates greater spending on education in the
poor community depend critically on the identity of the median voter in that
community. If the median voter is a middle income individual, then all
individuals are made worse off.If, on the other hand, the median voter is a
poor individual, the policy may increase all individuals' utilities.
A significant finding of our analysis is that a large number of policies
produce the same qualitative welfare effect for all individuals. This is
surprising since, given heterogeneity of individuals and the redistributive—30—
nature of the policies considered, one might have expected most policies to
generate both winners and losers. Community composition effects play a key
role in obtaining this consensus. The equilibrium distribution of individuals
between communities is inefficient in the absence of intervention; policies
that affect the equilibrium allocation of individuals, therefore, can make all
better off.
The analysis was deliberately carried out in a simple framework in order
to facilitate an understanding of the interactions of some of the basic forces
at work. The model as is captures several important features of the context
in which expenditures on primary and secondary education are determined in the
US: individuals differ in income, decision—making on educational finance
occurs largely at the local level, and households are mobile across
communities, Of course, many factors were left out and would be of great
interest to examine in future analyses. Prominent among these are: (i) the
existence of a private alternative to public education,3° (ii) the ability of
communities to render themselves more impermeable to the inflow of low income
individuals (through zoning, for example),31 (iii) different strategic
interactions among communities, (iv) dynamic considerations,32 Cv) the
existence of a housing market, (vi) an endogenous determination of the number
of communities, and (vii) interactions between state (or federal) and local
policies.
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Expenditures Per Pupil in Several School Districts
New Jersey,1988—89New York City Area,1989—90Chicago Area,1988—89
Princeton 7725 Great Neck 15594 Niles Township9371
Summit 7275 Marihasset 15084 New Trier 8823
/est Orange 6505 Jericho 1435S Glencoe 7363
Cherry Hill 5981 Mount Vernon 9112 ¶4lnnetka 7059
Jersey City 4566 Roosevelt 8349 Wilmette 6009
East Orange 4457 New York City 7299 ChIcago 5265
Paterson 4422
Camden 3538
Source: Kozol (1991)A. Tax on individuals
Table Two Simulation Results
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B. Tax on community one
Notes:
Specification in all cases is u(c)ca/a, i(q)=q. with y1l, y3=.95y2, —10.
(3=5,A=L20,.35, .45).Percent changes correspond to change from t=O to t.001.
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